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SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE
POWERS THAT BE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES OF
THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE*
DAVID SCHOENBROD**

Even with all its Frankensteinlike warts,
knobs, and (concededly) dangers, the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is worth
hewingfrom the ice.

-Antonin Scalia 1
INTRODUCTION

Richard Stewart 2 and Richard Pierce3 have turned their considerable talents to arguing that it would be wrong for the Supreme
Court to reinvigorate the delegation doctrine. They make two
points. First, they argue that no proposed test of improper delegation, including my own,4 is judicially manageable so that the delegation doctrine would replace administrative lawmaking with judicial
lawmaking. 5 Second, they argue that enforcing the delegation doctrine would exacerbate overcentralization of decisionmaking. 6
© 1986 David Schoenbrod.
Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A. (1963), Yale University; B. Phil.
(1965), Oxford University; LL.B. (1968), Yale Unversity.
I gained much from the comments on earlier drafts offered by Arthur Best, David Chang,
George Dent, William Nelson, Michel Rosenfeld, Cass Sunstein, and especially Harry Wellington, who, as a visiting professor at New York Law School, was a continuing source of
encouragement and insight. Ilya Frankel provided excellent research assistance.
1. Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, 4 REG., July-Aug. 1980, at 25, 28.
2. See Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (arguing that
judicial enforcement of delegation doctrine is undesireable due to absence of manageable test
and because detailed statutory commands will produce less responsible government).
3. See Pierce, PoliticalAccountability and Delegated Power: A Response To Professor Lowi, 36
AM. U.L. REV. 391, 393 (1987) (arguing that courts are institutionally incompetent to create
and apply a workable delegation doctrine).
4. See Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MicH. L.
REV. 1223, 1249-74 (1985) (developing proposed test of improper delegation).
5. Pierce, supra note 3, at 394-95; Stewart, supra note 2, at 325-28.
6. Pierce, supra note 3, at 404; Stewart, supra note 2, at 331.
*

**
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Part I of this Article shows that Stewart's and Pierce's criticism of
my improper delegation test is, at bottom, a criticism of its policy
consequences, not its judicial mananageability; it is their position
that turns courts into policy makers. Part II shows that the concern
that delegation is necessary to avoid overcentralization is founded
upon a time-honored misconception that delegation leads to concise, open-ended laws while an end to delegation must result in prolix, intrusive laws.
Even if Stewart's and Pierce's points had validity, they would not
bury the delegation doctrine if courts saw that it is vital to important
constitutional purposes. Specifically, the framers intended that the
article I legislative process would provide safeguards for public welfare and individual values, shielding them from the powers that be
and their use of factional politics. Delegation undoes these safeguards without providing adequate alternative safeguards. Part III
argues that the delegation doctrine is not a formalistic relic, but
rather is vital to such constitutional purposes. This is the most important part of the Article.
Stewart denies the delegation doctrine's vital role by suggestion
rather than argument. He labels the delegation doctrine formalistic
"fundamentalism," thereby implying that it lacks any vital constitutional purpose. 7 His paper does not squarely defend the legitimacy
of administrative lawmaking. Rather, he accurately asserts that the
policy problems with regulation have helped to spur the growing
questioning of the legitimacy of administrative lawmaking8 and
seems to assume that his fascinating "reconstitutive" statutory proposals would end serious concern about delegation's legitimacy.
But the legitimacy of administrative lawmaking rather than its policy
dimensions is particularly relevant to the topic of this symposium"The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies."
More important, however, is that delegation's constitutional purposes rather than its policy dimension should be what determines
the doctrine's fate before the courts. As the Court made clear in
INS v. Chadha,9 its role is to consider whether procedures are contrary to the Constitution rather than to consider whether they are
efficacious.10
Nonetheless, the Court has treated delegation as a question of
policy by deferring to Congress. The fourth and final part of this
7. Stewart, supra note 2, at 324-25.
8. Id. at 329.
9. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
10. See id. at 944 (arguing that utilitarian justification of one-house veto is not relevant to
constitutional analysis).
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Article argues that this approach misconceives Congress' ability to
consider the delegation issue and is an abdication of the Court's
own duty.
In urging the delegation doctrine, I fear being perceived as antisocial, if not lacking in practical sense, even though people with
widely divergent political views share my concerns. I There are reasons why thinking afresh about the legitimacy of administrative
power may stir resistance. Agencies play a prominent role in modem life. Some assume, quite wrongly, that the delegation doctrine
would force Congress to do all the work now done in the agencies. I
have argued elsewhere that enforcement of the delegation doctrine,
as properly defined, 12 would allow continued pursuit of regulatory
objectives, often more efficiently and successfully.13 Nonetheless,
restricting delegation would create significant transitional problems.
It would also create problems for those of us who think and write
about the real world because delegation has long seemed a fixed
point in a rapidly shifting legal landscape. Such upset gives a strong
reason to support arguments that delegation is legitimate and to reject arguments to the contrary.
Another reason for resistance is that the delegation doctrine was
associated with result orientation when used to strike down New
Deal legislation.' 4 The opinions of Justice Rehnquist15 suggest
once again that the doctrine can be used opportunistically because
they have pushed delegation concepts where it suits his politics but,
so far, not where it is less convenient. But the same can be said of
the case law authored by more liberal jurists that rejects the delegation doctrine's application to economic regulation, but uses essentially the same concept to preserve accountability and check
administrative discretion when it suits them.' 6 Yet the defenders of
the status quo charge that it is the delegation doctrine that is result
11. See Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1226, 1234-36 (noting various authorities addressing questionable constitutionality of delegation).
12. See id. at 1249-70 (articulating definition of delegation doctrine).
13. See id. at 1275-81 (arguing that government could perform better if rules statutes
were used); Schoenbrod, Goal Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 740, 803-24 (1983) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, Clean Air Act] (arguing that rules statutes,
derived from proper delegation theory, provide more efficient means to combat complex air
pollution problems).
14. In the two best known applications of the doctrine, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), the Court seemed to vent personal animosity to the President and philosophical disagreement with regulation.
15. See Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1236-37 (discussing recent Supreme Court opinions
invoking delegation doctrine); see also Mashaw, Prodelegation: IWhy Administrators should make
PolticalDecisions, 1J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 83 (1985) (analyzing recent opinions ofJustice Rehnquist and their implications for delegation doctrine).
16. Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1236-37.
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oriented. 17
I.

A JUDICIALLY MANAGEABLE TEST OF IMPROPER DELEGATION

Richard Stewart suggests that the Supreme Court should not
enforce the delegation doctrine because there is no judicially manageable test of improper delegation. 18 He writes that "in the delegation context, constitutional fundamentalism is fatally compromised by the unchallenged admission that Congress may delegate
some lawmaking powers to executive officials .. ,,19 Because some
delegation is to be allowed, reasons Stewart, there must be a pre20
dictable criterion to separate proper from improper delegation.
He surveys the literature and concludes that "no academic or judicial writer has been able to develop workable criteria that come
close to meeting the challenge." 2 1 The essential problem that Stewart finds in the proposed tests is that they are instrumental because
they ask the courts to balance the goals of the delegation doctrine
22
against the imperative that Congress cannot decide everything.
I have proposed another test of improper delegation, a test that
Stewart labels formalistic and that, he argues, is subject to criticisms
different from those to which previous tests are subject.23 My test of
improper delegation is somewhat formalistic, but formalism aids judicial manageability and is perfectly consistent with a doctrine having important instrumental purposes.2 4 In my view, Congress
should not delegate any legislative powers, but this does not mean
that Congress must make all the decisions. 25 Admissions from other
writers that some delegation is necessary derive from an overly
'2 6
broad understanding of "legislative powers."
Briefly summarizing a position that I staked out at some length
previously, my view is that Congress may not delegate any legisla17. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (arguing that abandonment of delegation doctrine leads to result orientation).
18. Stewart, supra note 2, at 324.
19. Id. at 324-25 (emphasis in original).
20. Id. at 325.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 325-27.
23. Id. at 326-27.
24. I am sympathetic to Jerry Mashaw's opinion that one must choose to approach a
separation of powers issue formalistically or as nonjusticiable because it is difficult to craft a
principled instrumental test. Mashaw, supra note 15, at 7. Nonetheless, the formalism/instrumentalism dichotomy is overdrawn for the same reason that we cannot rely exclusively on text or context in reading a statute. Instrumental goals can motivate a formalistic
test and the test should be interpreted in terms of those goals.
25. Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1249-51.
26. Id. at 1276-77.
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tive power that article I assigns to the legislative process. 27 At the
heart of these legislative powers are the making of rules of private
conduct. The executive and judicial branches would enforce these
rules, which need not and could not be so specific as to obviate the
need for interpretation. Congress could not, however, initiate a
scheme of regulation or taxation by expressing its goals and leaving
it to others to lay down the rules of conduct. Agencies could also
participate by recommending rules to Congress. The President
would have some power to manage our foreign affairs and public
property without legislated rules because, given the President's inherent powers, presidential power can exist without any legislative
28
act.
Stewart, 29 as well as Pierce, 30 correctly perceives that a key question regarding this test is whether the courts can distinguish between a statute that lays down a rule of conduct-such as "do not
emit more than so many pounds of a given pollutant"-from a statute that is in the form of a rule but in reality only sets forth goals"do not emit more pollution than the agency determines is reasonable in light of economic and environmental considerations." The
former would be a rule, the latter would not because it calls for policymaking rather than interpretation. On the other hand, even a
seemingly open-ended word such as "reasonable" can be the core
of a rule if its meaning in context is clear, such as in a society that
31
has stable customs as to polluting activity.
Stewart and Pierce see my proposed test as requiring Congress to
legislate with great precision. 3 2 Pierce, for instance, emphasizes
that my test means that a statute could not delegate "any policymaking power or discretion to the agency." 3 3 That is correct,3 4 but what
is incorrect is the implication that the statute must be so precise as
to head off any hard cases, making interpretation a mechanistic exercise. Although a numeric pollution limit is a rule, not all rules
must be numeric nor must their interpretation be clear-cut. Indeed,
even a numeric pollution limit will generate questions of interpretation, such as whether it really applies to unusual occurrences such as
27. Id. at 1249-74.
28. See id. at 1260-65 (noting that no legislative delegation of powers occurs when Congress establishes goals for President in foreign affairs and public power matters within the
scope of executive power).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
private

Stewart, supra note 2, at 327.
Pierce, supra note 3,at 398-99.
See Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1255.
Pierce, supra note 3, at 400; Stewart, supra note 2, at 327.
Pierce, supra note 3, at 399 (emphasis in original).
The agency still might have discretion for purposes other than the making of rules of
conduct, such as is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
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pollution equipment breakdowns or which of several different methods of measuring emission rates are to be used.
Is there any point to limiting agency discretion to make law if
there will be hard and debatable decisions as to the interpretation of
legislated rules? Yes, for two reasons. First, even though a rule may
present hard cases, it will typically present many more easy ones.
Therefore, requiring Congress to state a rule means that Congress
will have to make clear to most of the affected population the benefits and burdens being imposed. In contrast, when Congress allows
an administrator to establish the rules, the statute can, and usually
does, lay out all the beneficial goals that should be advanced, leaving most people in the dark as to the statute's adverse effects. So,
for instance, when the agency gets to determine how to protect
health from pollution, a given factory may be allowed to double
emissions or reduce them to zero. 3 5 We should bear this in mind
when evaluating whether the delegation doctrine serves a real
purpose.
Second, a statute framed to call for interpretation requires the interpreter to play a more constrained role than does a policy maker.
While the policy maker is asked to make value judgments, an interpreter must constantly submit to value judgments explicit or implict
in the statute. As I have explained at greater length before, 6 the
interpreter may deal with the hard cases by gleaning value judgments implied by the statute's disposition of easier cases and by legislative history, including agency and judicial practice prior to
enactment or reenactment. Stewart objects that "unless we are
given a fuller account of the interpretive process than Schoenbrod
provides, not much reliance can be placed on this approach without
endorsing an effective delegation of legislative power to the courts,
a result Schoenbrod is (understandably) as concerned to avoid as
delegation to the administrators. '8 7 Given that scholars have written extensive accounts of interpretation, Stewart apparently means
that any such account would be debatable. I agree. But that disagreement should not obscure interpretation's fundamental difference from policymaking. As Ronald Dworkin so eloquently argues,
most judges and lawyers act as if they accept this difference and tak35. Schoenbrod, Clean Air Act, supra note 13, at 765-66.
36. Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1255-58. Stewart takes me to mean that a statute can be
upheld, if originally invalid, so long as it is interpreted prior to its challenge on delegation
grounds. Stewart, supra note 2, at 327 n.27. This is not my position and I agree with Stewart's
objections to it. I suggested that interpretation of statutory language prior to its enactment
could save an otherwise invalid statute. Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1277.
37. Stewart, supra note 2, at 327 n.27.
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ing their opinions and behavior at face value is the most plausible
understanding of law's operation.3 8 So even though different
judges may have different theories of interpretation and approach a
given statute with different preconceptions, 3 9 they can agree that
their role requires them to produce the best interpretation of the
40
statute enacted rather than to create the best statute they can.
The judge must honor the legislature's priorities 4 1 and, in difficult
cases, these priorities can be sought by scrutinizing how the legisla43
42
tion disposes of the easy cases, as I have suggested before.
A recent, prominent example of the difference between a statute
that states a rule calling for difficult interpretation and a statute that
states only goals is the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Gramm-Rudman), 4 4 upheld against a delegation of legislative power challenge
by the District Court in Synar v. United States.45 The statute set precise dollar limits on the size of the deficit, but measuring future deficits is subject to uncertainty, as is measuring pollution, and there are
different concepts of what constitutes a deficit. Nonetheless, the
district court's opinion defensibly concluded that prior practice and
legislative history provided sufficient guidance to give content to
Gramm-Rudman's concept of a deficit. 46 Surely the job of deficit
estimation under that Act is far more circumscribed than under an
act instructing an agency to determine what size deficit was sufficient
to achieve some range of goals, even precisely stated goals such as
keeping inflation or interest rates below a certain level.
Another example of a rules statute that calls for nonmechanistic
interpretation are the provisions of tide VII prohibiting employment decisions based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin except where based upon bona fide occupational qualifications. 47 The statute has required extensive interpretation and these
38.

R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 37-44 (1986).

39. Id. at 301, 304-15.
40. Id. at 238, 337-38.
41. Id. at404,451 n.ll.
42. Id. at 339-40.
43. Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1255-58.
44. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act, 2
U.S.C.A. § 901 (West Supp. 1986).
45. 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aft'don othergrounds sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct.
3181 (1986).
46. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1387-89 (D.D.C.) (discussing prior
practice and legislative history), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct.
3181 (1986). Elsewhere, the district court expressed a weak version of the delegation doctrine with which I disagree. See id. at 1383-84 (stating that delegation doctrine, although valid
law, is properly applied with deferential scope).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
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interpretations 48 are subject to debate. 4 9 Nonetheless, common
perceptions about the meaning of discrimination and bona fide occupational qualification, unlike terms such as public interest, mean
that the statute is not a general invitation for the courts or the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to make policy rather than
to interpret. Again, the existence of hard cases under the statute
should not blind us to the statute's ability to make many more cases
easy.
The Federal Trade Commission Act (Act) 50 provides a useful
counterexample. As originally enacted, the Act prohibited "unfair
methods of competition." 51 The Court held that the Act allowed
the Federal Trade Commission only to interpret and enforce an existing common law cause of action.5 2 Although the Act as so interpreted might be considered a rules statute, subsequent judicial
reinterpretation of the Act gave the Commission a more openended mandate to pursue the goals of the Act, unconfined by common law standards. 53 Then, in 1938, the Act was amended to give
the Commission authority to move against "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices," 5 4 a term unconfined by common law or customary
standards. The Act today is a goals statute.
Another example of the difference between rules statutes and
goals statutes, which I have used before 55 and which Richard Pierce
criticizes,5 6 comes from public utility rate regulation under the "just
and reasonable" standard. Pierce's criticism is based upon a confusion whose clarification adds to the illustrative value of the example.
According to a book that Pierce coauthored:
The most common method used to control aggregate revenue
and to set maximum rates has evolved over more than one hundred years of regulation. It begins with calculation of a firm's revenue requirements through application of the formula: R =
O+B(r), where R is the firm's allowed revenue requirements, 0 is
48. See M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN &J. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 3-256 (1982) (discussing myriad interpretations of title VII provisions).
49. See, e.g., id. at 130-32 (discussing debate surrounding title VII interpretations).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
51. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
52. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920). But see id. at 429 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(arguing that problems of unfair competition necessitate broad congressional regulatory
power).
53. See Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771,
776 (1975).
54. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. I11 (1938) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
55. Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1258-59.
56. Pierce, supra note 3, at 399-402.
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base, and r is the
the firm's operating expenses, B is the firm's rate
57
base.
rate
its
on
allowed
return
of
rate
firm's
The Supreme Court adopted a version of this rule as a limitation
upon the states' power to regulate under the takings clause of the
fourteenth amendment in the 1898 case, Smyth v. Ames. 58 The approach adopted by the Court also gave content, as a matter of statutory interpretation, to the term "just and reasonable" in many
statutes enacted thereafter.
The definition of the rate base in Smyth v. Ames, however, presented much discussed problems. 5 9 In Smyth, the Court held that
the rate base, which it termed "fair value of the property," should
be framed by considering four different concepts of the utility's capital: the original cost of its plant, its reproduction cost, its earning
capacity, and the amount and value of the utility's stocks and
bonds. 60 This definition of rate base tends to undercut the rule
character of a statute based exclusively upon Smyth v. Ames because
these four quantities may be quite different. In addition, the third
and fourth concepts are circular because they are functions of the
rates that can be charged. Also, the second concept, reproduction
cost, presents a problem of policy because it is often difficult to estimate. Today, most jurisdictions use original cost. 6 1 Rate regulation
statutes enacted with an understanding that original cost will be
plugged into the formula are rules statutes.
FPCv. Hope Natural Gas Co.,62 decided in 1944, worked at least two
very different sorts of changes in Smyth v. Ames. First, the Court
freed regulators from evaluating the rate base in terms of Smyth v.
Ames' four concepts, thereby allowing, for instance, the use of original cost as the sole measure of rate base. 63 Second, the Court held
that neither the Constitution nor the statute in question prohibited
the Federal Power Commission from departing from the formula altogether, provided that the prices set are reasonably calculated to
achieve the goals of rate regulation.6 4 This second change, unlike
the first, transforms a rules statute into a goals statute because the
Commission has broad discretion to weigh competing interests.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 97 (1982).
169 U.S. 466 (1898).
See Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1259-60 (discussing problems of defining rate base).
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898).
See E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 57, at 112 (noting that 38 states use original

cost analysis exclusively); 2 G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 496 (1969)

(describing majority's use of original cost analysis in terms of accuracy, practicability, and
expediency).
62.1 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
63. Id. at 602-03.
64. Id. at 607.
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Nonetheless, the formulaic rule still remains important, as the
Pierce book suggests, 65 partly because some statutes were enacted
against an understanding that the agencies would be constrained by
the rule.
Pierce claims that "[s]cholars unanimously applaud the wisdom of
the Court's decision in Hope to abandon its prior rigid rules approach" 66 and that Hope "demonstrates the futility of an effort to
require statutory precision in statutes that delegate regulatory
power." 6 7 The authorities Pierce cites, his own book included, however, criticized the Smyth v. Ames' definition of rate base rather than
its concept that rates should be governed by rule rather than discretion. 6 8 Pierce thus confounds the first change that Hope worked,
which aids governing rates through a rule, and the second change,
which ensures that rate regulation is a matter of policy. Pierce also
writes as if I were unaware of Hope and its impact on rate regulation,
69
which is manifestly wrong.
65. See E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 57, at 108-10 (noting that modern agencies
have carried over many of same principles of formulaic rule); see also G. PRIEST, supra note 61,
at 501 (stating that impact of Hope was softened by constitutional and statutory provisions in
many states).
66. Pierce, supra note 3, at 402.
67. Id. at 400.
68. See E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 57, at 105-10; A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 37-39 (1970). Kahn suggests in another passage that original cost versus reproduction cost may be advantageous or disadvantageous to the utility depending upon whether
the times are inflationary or deflationary. A. KAHN, supra, at 40. As a matter of constitutional
law, the second element of Hope would certainly allow a commission to choose between original cost, or reproduction cost, or some combination thereof because the commission is allowed flexibility. Such flexibility is inconsistent with a rules statute, but denying such
flexibility seems not to present great policy problems because, as noted, most jurisdictions
use original cost. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing majority's use of original cost analysis).
69. That is the suggestion of his text, but I take up Hope explicitly as a counterexample.
Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1259. Pierce acknowledges as much in a footnote, but claims
that I mistakenly read Hope as applying solely to natural gas cases. Pierce, supra note 3, at 399
n.53. I have recognized the widespread impact of Hope elsewhere. Schoenbrod, Clean Air Act,
supra note 13, at 789 n.285. I did suggest, however, that the problems of applying cost of
service to natural gas pricing at the wellhead helped to produce the result in Hope. Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1259. As already discussed, the amount and value of stocks and bonds
and the earning potential of the property involve circularity. For most utilities, however, original cost and reproduction cost make conceptual sense as a way to value the rate base. Nonetheless, they do not make much sense when applied to the price of natural gas at the wellhead.
Reproduction cost is a far-fetched concept when applied to a nonrenewable natural resource
which often cannot be synthesized at competitive prices. In the case of natural gas, original
cost also can be problematic because, at a time when the only substantial markets are regulated, the price that someone will be willing to pay for gas in the ground is a function of the
price for which the gas can be sold, which leads to circularity. The same problem does not
exist for an electric generating plant, for example, because the elements of its construction
have market prices.
My original discussion of Smyth v. Ames and Hope did not address the complexities of calculating the rate base nor did it assess systematically the approach to ratemaking in different
jurisdictions for different products at different times. Id. The original discussion was but a
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Stewart and Pierce object to my proposed test on the grounds
that it would invalidate a major portion of the United States Code,
with Pierce estimating that ninety-nine percent of it would fall 70 and
Stewart wondering why I do not fess up by providing a percentage
estimate of my own. 71 But it is easy to see why Pierce's estimate is
wildly high and Stewart's call for a neat number is unreasonable.
Many statutes that are not precise still will be valid on the basis that
their imprecision calls for interpretation rather than policymaking.
Any serious effort to evaluate the validity of a range of statutes
would have to investigate not just their language but also their contexts and legislative histories, including the possibility that an otherwise invalid statute was given content through administrative or
judicial interpretation, which was then ratified through reenactment.
Moreover, my proposed test would not invalidate statutes dealing
with matters within the President's inherent powers.
Stewart and Pierce set out to argue that no one has offered a test
of delegation that would avoid result orientation, but they end up
arguing that they do not like the results that my test would produce. 72 Their coming full circle in this way suggests that nonenforcement of the delegation doctrine itself presents the danger of
result orientation. Stewart and Pierce would have the Court avoid
the doctrine for want of a manageable standard, but the Court regularly applies less manageable standards. 73 To avoid the delegation
doctrine for lack of a manageable test would be a pretext for result
orientation.
Result orientation is apparent in the Court's present approach to
delegation and related doctrines. The Court has routinely turned
aside modern challenges to economic regulation stated in delegation terms, but has struck down official actions for similar delegation-like reasons without providing a principled explanation for the
page long and its point was not to lay out the law of rate regulation, but rather to illustrate the
distinction between statutes that contain rules and those that do not. Id.
70. Pierce, supra note 3, at 401.
71. Stewart, supra note 2, at 327.
72. Pierce, supra note 3, at 401; Stewart, supra note 2, at 327-28. Pierce makes a particular point of criticizing the National Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982),
which I cited for the proposition that Congress can mobilize itself to enact detailed regulation
if it thinks that important, not as necessarily good policy. Pierce, supra note 3, at 402-03;
Schoenbrod, supranote 4, at 1276 n.299. In any event, Pierce's use of that Act to demonstrate
the policy superiority of delegation is far from convincing because the broad delegation under
lope that he so praises resulted in terrible natural gas shortages and motivated Congress to
pass the Act. Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1276.
73. E.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2804 (1986) (creating test for unconstitutional gerrymandering that entails evaluation of whether election management weakens voters' influence on general political process).
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difference in outcome. 74 Chadha, for instance, is a delegation case in
75
all but name.
Another reason why ignoring the delegation doctrine perpetrates
result orientation is that courts face petitions to review administrative lawmaking, which inevitably tempts many judges to make policy
in the guise of judicial review. 76 As then Professor Scalia stated:
The argument may be made that in modem circumstances the unconstitutional delegation doctrine, far from permitting an increase in judicial power, actually reduces it. For now that judicial
review of agency action is virtually routine, it is the courts, rather
than the agencies, that can ultimately determine the content of
standardless legislation. In other words, to a large extent, judicial
invocation of the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is a self-denying ordinance, forbidding the transfer of legislative power not
77
to the agencies but to the courts themselves.
If enforcement of a constitutional doctrine causes practical difficulties that are sufficiently severe, it may well be appropriate for the
Court to find a way to avoid the harm. Assuming that is so, the
appropriate response for the Court is not to forget the constitutional concern, as Stewart and Pierce appear to suggest, but to deal
with the policy concerns in a way that does the least possible harm
to the constitutional principle. For instance, the courts did not
shrink from striking down malapportioned legislatures even though
invalidating all laws enacted by such legislatures would have
wreaked havoc. Instead, the courts left previously enacted laws in
force. 78 There are a variety of ways that the courts could preserve
previously promulgated administrative lawmaking if they concluded
79
that chaos would otherwise result.
74. See Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1231-35 (noting inconsistencies in Court's treatment
of economic regulations).
75. See Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1235-36 (arguing that Court's rationale in Chadha
was inconsistent with Court's usual practice in delegation cases).
76. This is a standard point in teaching materials and scholarship. See, e.g., R. STEWART &
J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoLicy 673-732 (2d ed. 1978) (acknowledging judicial
overreaching in light of broad scope of judicial review); Pierce, The Role of Constitutionaland
Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REV. 469, 485 (1985) (discussing impact of
judges' personal political philosophies on statutory interpretation); Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1809-10 (1975) (analyzing scope ofjudicial
review as vehicle for judicial policymaking).
77. Scalia, supra note 1, at 28.
78. See infra note 136.
79. First, challenges to previously promulgated administrative laws may be barred by
statutory or equitable deadlines for filing petitions to review. Second, as in the malapportionment cases, the courts could invoke the delegation doctrine on some prospective basis.
Antonin Scalia suggested the possibility of applying the doctrine only to statutes enacted after
the date of a decision breathing new life into the doctrine. Scalia, supra note 1, at 28. Application of the doctrine solely to such regulations promulgated after that date is another
possibility.
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THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE CAN REDUCE RATHER THAN
ACCENTUATE THE PROBLEM OF OVERCENTRALIZATION

Richard Stewart has criticized many statutory schemes that employ administrative lawmaking for stifling innovation and efficiency
through overcentralization, for making decisions through unduly
protracted procedures, for losing sight of public purposes, and for
being co-opted by private actors. 80 Stewart would deal with these
problems by replacing prescriptive statutes-statutes that call for
command and control regulation-with "reconstitutive" statutesstatutes that make use of less centralized decisionmaking processes
81
such as market mechanisms or state governments.
Stewart argues that the delegation doctrine would exacerbate the
centralization problem by requiring that decisions about a complex
and varied country be made not just within the national government, but within one part of that government: the legislative process. He suggests, for instance, that I find the lengthy Clean Air
Act 8 2 insufficiently specific and would advocate a more lengthy and
detailed statute. 83 Stewart's assertion is based upon the old assumption that statutes that delegate must be more brief and less
intrusive than statutes that establish rules.
The Clean Air Act illustrates the error in this assumption. Despite its great length, most of the Clean Air Act delegates rather
than establishes rules. 84 Why is the Act so long, even though it delegates so freely? As Stewart suggests, part of the reason is that it
eases the application of administratively created laws to specific
industries, a practice that, as this Act illustrates, can occur in statutes that delegate as well as those that do not. But the major reason
for the Act's prolixity is that it delegates in great detail, even though
it avoids coming to grips with the most important issues of policy.8 5
The Clean Air Act, like most delegating statutes, does not simply
pass the buck but rather passes it along with complicated
instructions.
80. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 328-29 (arguing that overcentralization caused by administrative lawmaking inadequately addresses modem, complex regulatory needs); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A ConceptualFramework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1275
(1981) (urging fundamental changes in administrative framework to ensure both productive
economy and healthy environment); Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Laws, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1365 (1985) (advocating reform of environmental lawmaking through use
of market mechanisms in order to maximize environmental resources, encourage environmentally superior technologies, and avoid penalties on innovation and investment).
81. Stewart, supra note 2, at 335-37.
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
83. Stewart, supra note 2, at 332.
84. Schoenbrod, Clean Air Act, supra note 13, at 762-66.
85. Id.
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Some of reasons for such complicated instructions are not commendable. First, complicated instructions often serve to camouflage
the buck passing because legislators can hardly claim credit for solving a problem when the statute hands the problem to an agency
without saying more. Second, the complication in a statute serves to
compromise legislative disputes as to whether an agency should be
granted a power by granting the power, but in a form that makes it
hard to use it. Third, the complication obscures the legislative mandate requiring agencies to reconcile irreconcilable goals.8 6 Fourth,
the complication helps to prevent the unsophisticated from realizing
87
that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.
How could one Congress sitting in Washington deal with an issue
such as air pollution, in a statute that does not delegate, given wide
variations in environmental conditions and problems of pollution
control? I dealt with this precise question at length previously and
concluded that, as a matter of policy, Congress ought neither to
delegate or prescribe inflexible emissions limits for all sources.8 8
My proposal was that Congress prescribe emission limits for select
categories of sources, leaving others to state control.8 9 In addition,
sources should be allowed to deviate from the statutory limits
through market mechanisms allowing for the buying and selling of
emission rights.9 0 In other words, I proposed the use of what Stewart calls reconstitutive approaches as a way of limiting the need for
central control.
Stewart, along with Bruce Ackerman, proposed a related approach to the air pollution problem in which Congress would establish a limit on the emission of given pollutants in a given region and
then provide for the auctioning off of these emission rights to potential sources. 9 1 This is a reconstitutive approach, although in my
view not the best one. 9 2 It is also a rules statute-a rule prohibiting
86. Id.
87. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 10 (1982).
88. Schoenbrod, Clean Air Act, supra note 13, at 803-16.
89. Id. at 813.
90. Id. at 814-15.
91. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 80, at 1352-55. Their proposal comes in two versions. The first version is a rules statute because Congress would establish the operative rule
of conduct, prohibiting emission pending the purchase of pollution rights at auction, and
Congress would specify the total emission rights sold for each region. Id. The second version
seems to call for delegation. See id. at 1355 (stating that proposed statute would confer discretion on federal, state, and local agencies).
92. I am troubled by the equity of the government claiming the right to sell pollution
rights to property owners that have long considered that their property includes the right to
emit to an extent that does not unreasonably, as determined by some government process,
harm others. This feature, however, is not a necessary part of a market-based approach to
pollution control.
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emissions unless one owns emissions rights purchased under the
scheme. It illustrates my point that reconstitutive strategies do not
necessarily require delegation.
One troubling aspect of Stewart's stance is that policy analysts
have long urged Congress to adopt market-based approaches to
pollution, but have had little success. 93 Stewart and Pierce contend
that Congress is more apt now than before to use reconstitutive
strategies because the demise of the legislative veto and related
events require Congress to exert its power through more meaningful legislation, and reconstitutive legislation is the best way to be
meaningful. 94 The central premise of this argument is, as Pierce
puts it, that "Congress ...can exercise that [policymaking] power
only through use of the procedures provided in the Constitution
...."95 This premise is flawed; Congress can continue to delegate
and still exert influence through the appropriations process, oversight hearings, threats to amend the delegation, and Senate review
of appointments. In any event, Pierce's argument does not deal
with a central reason as to why congressional members prefer delegations: delegation and the factional legislation that it facilitates enhance the private interests of members of Congress. That these
private interests seem to mean more to many in Congress than the
institution in which they serve throws further doubt on Pierce's prediction that Congress will take more responsibility in establishing
regulatory schemes. Enforcement of the doctrine would undercut
96
these private motivations.
Stewart makes the additional point that specific statutes are often
simply unwise, citing Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler's classic
study of the regulation of coal burning electric generators under the
Clean Air Act. 9 7 Ackerman and Hassler argued that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted an unnecessarily costly
strategy to meet its air pollution goals partly because Congress got
93. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAw &
POLICY 269 (1984).
94. See Pierce, supra note 3, at 414-15 (arguing that Congress will adopt reconstitutive
strategies due to judicial return to constitutional fundamentalism and increased activism of
executive branch); Stewart, supra note 2, at 342-43 (following Pierce).
95. Pierce, supra note 76, at 524.
96. Stewart says that the courts should not reinvigorate the delegation doctrine so that
Congress will adopt reconstitutive legislation. Stewart, supra note 2, at 343. Rather, the
Court should enforce the delegation doctrine because it is part of the Constitution and has
earned its constitutional status because it serves to discourage the abuse of public power. See
infra notes 13240 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional values of delegation
doctrine).
97.

Stewart, supra note 2, at 332 n.45. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN AIR/DIRTY

COAL 116-28 (1981) (discussing problems arising from congressional attempts to combat
complex environmental problems).
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involved in the specifics of the regulation. Ackerman and Hassler
pieced together an important story, but they draw the wrong moral
from it when they conclude that Congress should leave the specifics
to agencies. The problem was not in Congress deciding, but in
Congress delegating. 98 The regulation that Ackerman and Hassler
criticize as unwise was not enacted but promulgated pursuant to a
delegation. 9 9 Congress helped to create the extra cost of pollution
control by requiring, somewhat ambiguously, that the EPA regulate
in a way to protect the eastern coal industry.100
Delegation helped to shield Congress from political responsibility
for the extra costs that it was imposing for two reasons. First, no
one could begin to estimate those costs because Congress was not
enacting the rules of conduct. Indeed, other provisions of the delegation called upon the agency to promulgate regulations that were
cost efficient so that Congress could point to its concern for pocketbook issues. 10 ' Second, the requirement that the agency protect
eastern coal was itself ambiguous, thereby further diffusing Congress' responsibility.
Delegation encourages Congress to enact unnecessarily costly
laws, unnecessarily ambiguous laws, and flatly contradictory laws.
In short, delegation encourages bad laws because members of Congress do not have to take responsibility for the rules of conduct that
eventually emerge from the delegation process. So long as delegation allows politicians to enact laws that promise all things to all
people, exhorting them to delegate in a different way is spitting into
the wind.
My policy preference for Congress to take responsibility by enacting rules derives not from any belief that members of Congress are
particularly public spirited. To the contrary, I distrust them as well
as the Executive and believe that the most effective check on those I
distrust is requiring action through the legislative process. This apparently was also the view of those who played key roles in drafting
the Constitution, as the next part argues. Their views are far more
relevant to the constitutional questions than the policy preferences
of Richard Stewart, Richard Pierce, myself, or other participants in
this debate.
98. See Schoenbrod, Clean Air Act, supra note 13, at 750-51 (arguing that problems of
Clean Air Act stem from broad delegation).
99. See id. at 801-02 (discussing breadth of agency delegation under Clean Air Act).
100. See Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE Lj.
1466, 1493 (discussing EPA attempts to protect eastern coal industry).
101. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1982) (requiring agency to assess cost of
achieving emission reduction).
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THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AS A DEFENSE AGAINST FACTIONS

When you censure the age,
Be cautious and sage,
Lest the courtiers offended should be.
If you mention vice or bribe,
'Tis so pat to all the tribe,
Each cries, 'That was levell'd at me!'
102
-John Gay
The authors of The Federalist Papers did not believe that just any
political processes, let alone any one legislative process, would heed
the public interest. Rather, they designed a particular legislative
process, involving the House, Senate, and President, that they
hoped would at least tend to protect the public interest.
Their distrust of ordinary political processes was based upon fear
of "factions." Madison defined "faction" as "a number of citizens
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion or interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community." 10 3 This suggests that a faction is a group that pursues its own interests without regard to its
impact on others; in other words, a group that beggars its neighbors. For instance, a faction that is a majority may seek some small
benefit for each of its members at the cost of grave harm to the minority. For another example, a faction that is a minority may
achieve, by superior organization, some gain for its members, even
though the harm to the rest of the community is larger.
There is of course much room for disagreement as to how to
judge the "permanent and aggregate interests of the community."
We need not settle on any one criterion of the public interest, however, because the framers did not require laws to serve the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. Rather, the framers
designed a legislative process to frustrate factions.
Although the word "faction" has an old-fashioned ring, suggesting something like a group of bewigged merchants or politicos
meeting in a colonial tavern, faction is also a modern concern. Today's factions are trade associations that co-opt regulation, ideological organizations that impose their ethics on the rest of us, or other
powers that be. Today we use a variety of tags to express similar
concepts. Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson talk about public
102.
103.

The Beggar's Opera Act II, aria 27 (libretto, The Decca Record Company, Ltd., 1981).
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (1.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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power being used to produce private goods;1 0 4 others speak of special interests or interest groups. Theodore Lowi labels modern acceptance of government based upon factions as "interest group
liberalism." 1 0 5
The authors of The Federalist Papers explained how procedure, a
lawyerly response, would tend to frustrate factions. Their procedural protection was the requirement that lawmaking go through
the article I process. To show the continuing importance to the
Constitution of this protection, this part makes four points: (1) the
framers specifically designed the legislative process to include safeguards against factions, safeguards that the administrative process
lacks; (2) contemporary economic analysis provides reason to believe in the efficacy of these safeguards; (3) these safeguards protect
not just community welfare, but also important constitutional values; and (4) the Supreme Court and many modern commentators
err in believing that the administrative process offers adequate alternative safeguards.
A.
1.

The Legislative Process' Safeguards Against Factions

Bicameralism and the presidentialveto

Article I provides multiple safeguards against factions that the administrative process lacks. The framers involved a Senate, a House,
06
and the President in the legislative process as a check on factions.1
Defeat or inaction in any of these three different institutions would
ordinarily stymie the faction.' 0 7 That each is elected for different
tenures based upon different apportionments of voting power
would make it harder for parochial interests to succeed in all three
institutions.10 8 As Hanna Pitkin characterized Madison's approach
to the problem of factions, "the danger is action and the safeguard
104. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 87, at 6-7 (discussing collective production of private goods and corresponding managerial view of delegation).
105. See T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 71 (1969) (explaining that interest group liberalism is premised on idea that policy and public interest is defined in terms of organized
interests in society).
106. See THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 378 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (arguing that
Senate is additional guard against ill-advised legislation); THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (discussing purpose of presidential veto as guard against
factions).
107. The exception is, of course, that presidential opposition can be overcome by
supermajorities in the House and Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
108. See THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 378-79 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (discussing
number of senators and duration of their tenure as disincentive to factions); see also Bruff,
Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REV. 207, 218-20 (1984) (analyzing
structure of congressional decisionmaking and presidential veto as promoting stability of legislation and reducing influence of factions).
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is stalemate."' 10 9 In comparison, delegation from the legislative process to an agency simplifies action by giving the power to one institution. Indeed, ease of action is a supposed virtue of delegation.
2.

The educational value of the legislative process

Madison hoped that the time elapsed in stalemate would allow for
the public to learn of the issues at hand, thereby producing more
mature and educated decisions.110 As political theorists have
pointed out, representation should not be just a one way street: the
representative should not only represent constituents to the central
government, but also represent the nation to local factions.' 1 In
other words, representatives should also return home to explain
how it is that parochial desires cannot be achieved. This should
bring maturation.
Delegation undercuts this maturation by allowing legislators to include many conflicting parochial desires among the goals for an
agency to pursue "to the extent practicable." The legislator can
then come home claiming victory. When the constituents become
frustrated later, the legislator can blame those "damned bureaucrats." This is a recipe for alienation, not maturation. It is also a
political form of "bait and switch" advertising.
3.

The size and diversity of the representative bodies

Madison claimed that a republic large enough to include many
factions with legislative bodies large enough to include representatives from many factions would hinder factions."12 Bringing many
109. H. PrrisN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 195 (1972). The Constitution, of
course, did not seek to frustrate action altogether. Indeed, inability to act under the Articles
of Confederation helped to spur the Constitution.
110. See id. at 195-96 (discussing Madison's philosophy that political process allows community to prevail over selfish faction interest).
111. See J. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLrrICAL THEORY 310 (1979) (noting that elections
provide voice for community to express its own interests and allows representative to inform
voters of national interests); H. PrriN, supra note 109, at 196 (discussing dual nature of national representation).
112. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81-84 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (discussing
advantages of large republics in guarding against factions); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 325 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (concluding that variety of interests embraced by American
republic discourages oppression by factious majorities); THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 383 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (arguing that requiring concurrence of select and stable body
promotes accountabilty for long-term consequences).
Madison also was concerned, however, that a legislature with so many members would devolve real power upon a few individuals. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (stating that number of representatives should serve to guard against faction, but also should avoid confusion of multitude); THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 341-44 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (concluding that size of Senate and House will help to prevent tyranny); THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 356-57 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (commenting on possible augmentation of number of representatives in terms of distribution of
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different factions together in one process would increase the chance
that factions would frustrate each other.
Delegation radically reduces the membership of the entities that
adopt rules. Delegation is from large bodies to a single administrator or a small group of commissioners, the majority of whom typically come from one political party. As noted, Madison believed
that an appropriately-sized body was more likely to encompass the
diverse interests among the public. A similar belief that a larger
group is more likely to see diverse sides of an issue probably is the
genesis of such traditions as the jury 13 and the corporate board of
4
directors. 1
Delegation creates balkanization in which factions can avoid facing each other in one legislative process. Instead, we create a separate administrative process for each major faction. Despite the
theory that interest groups will be represented at the agency
level,11 5 in practice only a few interests get heard. 1 16 Often the only
interests heard from will be the industry regulated or, more accurately, those members of the industry that are large firms or who
have some control over the trade association. Sometimes other organized groups will be effective, such as rival industries or state officials. Sometimes too, citizen organizations become involved. But
real power). Madison expressed varying views as to the appropriate absolute size of the
House. See Whelan v. Cuomo, 415 F. Supp. 251, 257-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting Madison's
views on appropriate size of House and his concern with preventing oligarchic influences on
government). Article I, § 2 of the Constitution expressly limits the size of the House of Representatives to no more than one representative per 30,000 population, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2, cl. 3, but that limit is no longer meaningful as there could be over 7000 members of the
House with today's population. See Whelan v. Cuomo, 415 F. Supp. 251, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(noting vast increase in House membership if increased to constitutional maximum).
Richard Stewart is probably right that laws would be better made by far fewer than 535
persons, the combined membership of the House and Senate. Stewart, supra note 2, at 331.
But, the size of the House has been and could be changed by statute. Thus, at least in theory,
there is no need to choose between delegation and an overstuffed House. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 2,
2(a) (1982) (providing mechanism for reapportionment of House); see also Whelan v. Cuomo,
415 F. Supp. 251, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussing past congressional reapportionments).
Therefore, Stewart's point should be a concern for political processes rather than a reason for
the Court to forget the delegation doctrine. That the legislative process has the power to
reduce the size of the House does not mean, however, that the power will be used. Members
of Congress appear to oppose either losing their jobs or doing them. For that matter, if we
now have too many senators to make the Senate an august body, amending the Constitution
to provide for one senator per state instead of the two per state, now required by the seventeenth amendment, would be more consistent, in my view, with the spirit of the Constitution
than allowing massive delegation of legislative power.
113. See generally D.JONES, THE LAw OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS AND CRrrIQUE
16-18 (1981) (discussing origins ofjury system).
114. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BusiNESS 47 (1977).
115. See Stewart, supra note 76, at 1760-61 (discussing interest group representation in
agency adjudication).
116. See id. at 1760-90 (analyzing adequacy and practibility of interest representation
system).
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they have the resources to intervene in only a small fraction of all
matters that affect their constituencies. And even if a public interest
organization is involved, it may well not be able to address effectively matters of importance to other citizens. For instance, a group
devoted to health and safety issues would have no direct interest in,
or political standing to assert, consumers' interests in preventing existing suppliers from using regulation to discourage potential competitors from entering the market.
Instead of reducing the power of factions by playing them off
against one another, agencies typically accentuate the power of factions. An agency established to regulate a given industry is likely to
find a mutuality of interest with that industry. The agency tends to
help the industry's trade association gain favor with the industry's
members and to defend the industry in Washington. The industry is
likely to return the favor when the agency seeks appropriations or
when its officials seek jobs outside of government.
B.

The Safeguards of the Legislative Process Tend to Work

The discussion so far has relied upon what The Federalist Papers
said as to why article I was framed as it was. Were these sayings
wishful thinking or is there sound reason to believe that article I
really will offer protection against factions? Richard Stewart, after
all, provides good reason to believe that factions will sometimes get
their way within the legislative process. 1 17 In a recent article,
Jonathan Macey evaluates article I's safeguards in light of the economic theory of legislation.1 18 He concludes that this
microeconomic analysis supports the position that article I is structured to discourage factional legislation.1 19 Macey also argues that,
because factional legislation "cannot be eliminated without cost,
one cannot conclude that the Constitution seeks to facilitate [fac120
tional legislation] merely because it fails to eliminate it entirely."
Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson also contend that
microeconomics supports adherence to the article I process. They
argue persuasively that delegation can help legislators reduce the
political costs that they would otherwise bear from satisfying such
117. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 332 (discussing dangers of use of subdelegation to meet
organized interest group demands).
118.

Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest

Group Model, 86 COLum. L. REv. 223, 247-49 (1986) (concluding that Constitution was
designed to impede interest groups from obtaining economic advantage through political
means).

119. Id. at 249.
120.

Id. at 245.

376

[Vol. 36:355

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

concentrated interests. 21 When the special interests get what they
want from the delegate, they will understand which legislators
helped them, but those hurt by the administrative action will be less
likely to blame the legislators whose acts were the indirect and remote cause of their woe.' 22
In still another recent article, Cass Sunstein evaluates The Federalist Papers' safeguards against factional legislation.' 23 While Macey
and I rely on the structural features of the federalist program, such
as bicameralism, presidential veto, and the composition and method
of selecting the two houses of Congress and the President, Sunstein
refers to these features, 124 but emphasizes another strand in
Madison's thinking-an idea that legislators would rise above factional self-interest and deliberate on the common good.

25

Microe-

economic theory and practical experience suggest that one ought
not to bank on politicians preferring the public interest to private
ambition, as Sunstein points out. 1 26

Madison, however, did not rely exclusively on the public spiritness of political animals, whether legislators or administrators as
Sunstein acknowledges.' 27 It is true that Edmund Burke would have
representatives vote their view of the long-term public interest
rather than their constituents' private desires. 28 Although Madison
121. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 87, at 57 (noting that members of Congress often attempt to shift blame to agencies when regulations have negative impact on constituent interests).
122. Id. Mashaw criticizes Aranson et al, but does not effectively counter their main point,
summarized in the text. Mashaw, supra note 15, at 89-90. Mashaw suggests that what Aranson
et al discuss is a fiscal illusion that will necessarily catch up with the legislators. Id. The voters,
however, are likely to blame the delegates not the legislators. Mashaw argues that their model
does not fully account for legislative behavior and is not backed by empirical data. Id. That of
course is true. But then again, no one has come up with an empirically supported and complete model of administrative behavior. Nor is it reasonable to expect one. While the Aranson et al account may leave room for improvement, its conclusion remains plausible.
123. See Sunstein, Interest Groups In American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 43-48 (1985)
(concluding that much of modern legal doctrine focuses on federalists' concerns with controlling factions).
124. See id. at 40 (explaining that diversity of interests inherent in large republic discourages factional tyranny); id. at 43-44 (discussing safeguards of bicameralism, electoral college,
indirect election, and separation of powers).
125. Id. at 31-35, 41-42, 45-48.
126. See id. at 48-49 (suggesting that factional struggle that Madison sought to escape
resembles contemporary political practices).
127. Id. at 42.
128. See H. PrrKIN, supra note 109, at 193-96 (discussing Burke's view of proper legislative
concerns). Many now think of Burke as elitist, patronizing, and unrealistic. Indeed, early
proponents of delegation saw expert agencies as the way to transfer power from selfish legislators who pandered to special interests. This reliance on expertise has proved no less elitist,
patronizing, and unrealistic than Burke's. Many scholars have commented upon the unrealism of hoping to find public officials who would steadily steer towards the long-term public
good. See Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 443, 450-53
(1977) (discussing knowledge shared by array of philosophers and analysts that government
cannot be administered by leaders dispensing wisdom for people and polity). The reality is
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hoped that legislators would be better than their constituents, he
also pointed out the danger in relying completely on such hopes. 129
It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust
these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the
public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the
helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all
without taking into view indirect and remote considerations,
which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one
party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of
0
the whole.'1
As Sunstein shows, agencies lack all of the structural features upon
which Madison relied to protect against factions when enlightened
statesmen fail.' 3 1
C.

The Legislative Process Protects Key Constitutional Values

The legislative process protects not just the general welfare but
also two additional constitutional values-accountability and individual rights.
1.

Accountability

The sharp differences between the legislative process and the administrative process go to a key constitutional value-electoral accountability. In traditional thinking, legislators in a republic are
accountable because their continuance in office depends upon reelection. 3 2 Delegation to an agency undercuts accountability because the delegate is unelected.
Is accountability unimportant because the electorate does not understand the substance of much legislation? No. Editorials, ratings
by interest groups, and political opponents give voters who care to
listen information on where their representatives stand. All this
puts representatives in fear of their constituents on issues about
which their constituents care. Such a system will not produce legisthat much agency decisionmaking requires interest balancing rather than just experience. See
Stewart, supra note 76, at 1684 (noting that agency interest-balancing forces nebulous and
conflicting policies into specific factual contexts); see also J. PENNOCK, supra note 11, at 325
(stating that Burke did not believe that representatives should ignore constituent desires).
129.

R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 6 (1956) (noting Madison's belief that

accumulation of power absent external checks leads to tyranny and deprivation of individual
rights); H. PITIN, supra note 109, at 194-95 (referring to Madison's fear that filtering effect of
wise representation could not control factions).
130. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
131. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 59-68 (discussing problem of controlling factions in administrative law).
132. SeeJ. PENNOCK, supra note 111, at 310 (stating that elections are great sanction for
assuring representative behavior).
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lation based consistently on good information, let alone legislation
that is rational. Such legislation would please neither Edmund
Burke nor the early advocates of administrative agencies who
wanted lawmaking to be a rational process. But both our legislative
and our administrative processes respond, in my view, more to pressures than to reason. But the legislative process has safeguards
designed to minimize the harm caused by unreasoning pressures.
Jerry Mashaw argues that legislation need not be specific in order
for voters to know where their representatives stand so that delegation does not undercut accountability.183 This misses the point of
accountability. Accountability is intended to impose public responsibility on those persons who make the rules. This purpose is defeated if members of Congress do not make the rules that govern
our conduct.
Do PAC's undermine accountability because members of Congress may respond more to heavy money than to the true interests
of their constituents? PAC money, as well as other sources of campaign funds, undoubtedly affects how Congress acts. Money, however, also influences how agencies operate. It takes money to hire
lawyers to appear before an agency, more money to hire the right
lawyers, and still more money to make campaign contributions to
the right members of Congress to intervene in one's behalf before
the agency. The point here is not that Congress is immune from
financial influence, but that money talks in Congress and in the
agencies. At least in the congressional context, the use of money is
more visible.
The argument that campaign contributions distort legislation assumes, reasonably, that a clever campaign to some extent can blind
constituents to their true interests. This point cuts more heavily
against delegation than the legislative process because, as Aranson,
Gellhorn, and Robinson have argued, delegation helps legislators
obscure their responsibility for costs imposed upon their
34
constituents. 1
Finally, it is arguable that delegation to an agency is no worse on
accountability grounds than the people's original delegation to
Congress 135 because there is no particular reason t,. suppose that an
133. See Mashaw, supra note 15, at 87-88 (arguing that statutory vagueness does not diminish electorate's knowledge of legislators because voters are interested in legislators' general ideological tendencies rather than stances on particular statutes).
134. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 87, at 38.
135. Every exertion of the police power, either by a legislature or by an administrative
body, is an exercise of delegated power. Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S.
176, 185 (1935).
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agency would mimic the results of a referendum in which the voters
participated directly any less well than would the legislature. The
electorate's grant of legislative power to representatives is, in itself,
a delegation made partly for convenience. Reposing the legislative
power in representatives rather than the voters themselves is generally thought wise because many voters are too numerous to debate
the issues, because some issues require rapid action, and because
representatives are likely to be better informed than voters. Today,
these same reasons of convenience allegedly require delegating the
legislative power from the legislature to the agency.
According to this argument, delegation from Congress to agencies is different in degree, but not in kind, from the sort of delegation blessed in the Constitution. This argument is wrong because
the delegation from the people is to a legislative process designed to
incorporate protections against factions, protections that the administrative process lacks. It is also wrong because the legislative process is not supposed to mimic the results of referenda where the
majority might well be a faction.
2.

The rights of regulatees

The legislative process protects regulatees as well as the public.
Their rights are not rights in the same sense that persons have
rights, for example, under the first amendment. Regulatees have no
immunity from the desire of the majority to regulate them so long as
the majority employs the article I process to enact the regulation.
The putative right under article I is, like procedural due process,
counter-majoritarian as to the process through which restrictions
are imposed, not their substance. In other words, persons have a
right to be regulated only through the super-majoritarian processes
of article I.
Should we regard regulatees' interest in the use of the legislative
process as a right? One may believe that the delegation doctrine,
for the regulatee, serves nothing more than a bare interest to avoid
regulation, unjustified by any principle. Enforcement of the delegation doctrine, however, will not always serve regulatees' interests.
The legislative process will produce regulations when the administrative process would not, just as the administrative process will in
other instances regulate when the legislative process will not. Indeed, industries often seek retention of regulatory statutes that
delegate because they fear the rules that the legislative process
would otherwise enact.
At the same time, regulatees do have a principled claim to the
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protection of the delegation doctrine.18 6 Regulators have ample
reasons to use their power for purposes that they would prefer to
keep secret. Their motive for action may be, for example, to reward
a campaign contribution, to secure the support of a trade association or a key member of Congress in legislative battle, or to punish
someone on an enemies list. Or, in better faith, the regulator may
wish to secure a benefit for the public that a court, if it knew the true
motive, would construe as a taking of property requiring compensation.
Judicial deference where regulations are challenged on the basis
of due process, equal protection, or takings helps the regulators
mask their motives.
Courts will ordinarily not look behind
an agency's articulated regulatory purpose 8 7 and will accept the
agency's contention that there is a factual basis to believe that the
regulation will substantially further that purpose, even though the
agency's position is highly debatable.13 8 This deference deprives
many regulatees of liberty and property for reasons that are venal or
simply the commandeering of private property for public purposes
without compensation. The reason for this deference is the supposition that the political process is generally well-suited to decide
whether the restrictions on the regulatees are reasonably
necessary. 13 9
If the regulatees are denied the benefit of careful judicial review
on the theory that the political process is adequate, then the regu-

latees ought to have the benefit of the sort of political process-the
article I legislative process-that the framers thought was suitable.
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton saw separation of powers as a protection of civil rights. In arguing against amending the Constitution to
136. A similar question is whether legislative malapportionment can be challenged by
regulatees as well as by voters. An argument for the general invalidity of the laws passed by a
malapportioned legislature failed in Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430,432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 17 (1963), when the court refused to hold a state habitual criminal statute unconstitutional under a collateral attack on a habeas corpus motion by the defendant. The court held
that, despite a failure to redistrict in accordance with constitutional mandate, legislative offices created by the state constitution were dejure offices, and incumbent legislators were at
least de facto officers, rendering their acts valid as acts of de jure officers. Id. The basis for
the decision was not lack of standing but fear of chaos that would be produced by retrospective rather than prospective invalidation. Id. If the court decided that delegation and malapportionment should be treated analogously, it would not deny rights to regulatees, but it
might make its rulings prospective if it thought chaos would otherwise result.
137. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1976) (noting acceptance of
agency's statement of purpose of its action).
138. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34-36 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1977).
139. See McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547 (1909) (upholding statute on grounds
that legislature's greater knowledge of local conditions makes it, rather than court, primary
authority).
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include enumerated rights, he wrote that the Constitution without a
bill of rights is "in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose,
A BILL OF RIGHTS." 1 40 Separation of powers is a kind of bill
of rights because, in our legal system, everything is permitted except
that which is prohibited by proper legal action. In the Constitution,
we the people authorized government to regulate us only in one
way-through a legislative process structured to minimize prohibitions for factional purposes, whether they hurt majorities or
minorities.
D.

The Administrative Process Does Not Provide Adequate
Alternative Safeguards

Proponents of delegation have not successfully defended its legitimacy. Some of the best writing on administrative law argues for delegation without dealing with its legitimacy. 14 ' Supreme Court
opinions have stayed away from trying to state a case for the legitimacy of delegation in recent years. Previously, the Court had tried
to legitimize delegation to agencies on the basis that it is consistent
with accountability and judicial review to ensure adherence to the
legislative will. 14 2 But accountability and judicial review to ensure
adherence to the legislative will are perfectly consistent with factional legislation. In any event, delegation has failed in practice to
14 3
deliver on these values.
Richard Stewart and other important figures in administrative law
argue that the administrative process provides safeguards against
discretionary power that are equal to or better than those provided
in article 1.144 This section confronts these arguments.
1.

Argument: delegation to an agency is better than delegation to a
congressional committee
Richard Stewart asserts that the "iron law of transaction costs"

140. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
141. Stewart concludes that delegation is necessary both as a practical matter and because
the courts lack a judicially manageable test, but he does not argue its legitimacy. See Stewart,
supra note 76, at 1693-98, 1802-13. Professor Bruff discusses the problem of factions, but
deals with delegation only briefly. See Bruff, supra note 108, at 215-20, 227. Professor Strauss
presents a way of reading the Constitution's text that accommodates a fourth branch, but does
not show how that reading serves the purposes of the delegation doctrine. See Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573
(1984).
142. Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1237-49.
143. Id.
144. E.g. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 3.15 (2d ed. 1978); Mashaw, supra
note 15, at 80-85.
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forces Congress to delegate to someone. 145 Stewart prefers that
Congress delegate to an agency with established procedures rather
than to a congressional committee.' 4 6 Kenneth Culp Davis similarly
writes that delegations are fine so long as sufficient safeguards constrain the exercise of agency power. 147 Some safeguards that he has
in mind are statements of reasons and the following of precedent.148
Stewart's argument has two flaws. First, Congress and the President must still act on a congressional committee's recommendations. At least for politically important decisions, accountability will
still exist. Second, the agencies' established rules of procedure are
not such a large advantage as Stewart suggests. Congress itself usually provides something similar to a notice and comment rulemaking
procedure when it calls hearings, accepts testimony, and publishes
committee reports attempting to justify decisions. If Congress enacts the rule, an individual cannot be sanctioned for breaking it
without various procedural protections provided under the Constitution and statute. Agency rulemaking does involve, however, one
procedural step that congressional action lacks-judicial review for
compliance with statutory mandates.
But judicial review is of limited help in assuaging the concerns
that gave rise to the delegation doctrine. Typically, the delegating
statute gives the agency latitude to balance incommensurate, competing interests in developing its regulatory restrictions. It is the
agency rather than the legislative process that sets priorities,
thereby undercutting accountability. The scope of review is limited,
based as it is upon the "arbitrary and capricious" test. That test
allows the agency ample room to choose among a wide variety of
outcomes so long as it mouths the appropriate statutory rubrics.14 9
So the regulatees are largely at the mercy of administrative
discretion.
One might try to put more "oomph" into agency procedures by
requiring more intrusive judicial review of agency rulemaking. This,
however, would place a difficult burden on judges, whose lack of
time and expertise would compel most of them to avoid a policymaking role. In any event, expanded judicial review would try to
145. Stewart, supra note 2, at 342.
146. See id. at 332 (arguing that subdelegation within Congress creates serious political
accountability problems).
147. K. DAvis, supra note 144, § 3.15.
148. Id.
149. See Bruff, supra note 108, at 239 (observing that agency desiring particular policy
outcome may perform "charade" of hearing from all interested parties, responding to them in
rational discourse, and issuing decision consistent with agency policy).
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overcome unaccountable agency power by creating policymaking
power in unaccountable courts.
To assert that procedures make agency decisions more principled
than those in Congress is to forget an observation that I will dub the
"iron law of political intervention," which holds that political power
will influence any agency. As Sunstein concludes, judicial efforts are
"highly unlikely to accomplish a great deal" in making agencies
truly deliberative. 150 In any event, established procedures do little
good for interests that are not represented, a frequent problem as
Stewart has taken the lead in showing. 5 1
In any event, the "iron law of transaction costs" is invalid. The
virtue of Stewart's own "reconstitutive strategies" is to reduce transaction costs by decentralizing decisions. Stewart is wrong in stating
52
that opponents of delegation reject such strategies.'
2.

Argument. the administrativeprocess can be supplemented by other
sources of accountability

Numerous devices offer to reconcile delegation with accountability by providing alternative ways to control the lawmaking process.
One such device was the legislative veto, which permitted Congress
to delegate to the Executive, yet retain control by vetoing actions
through the votes of one or two houses. The Court, in INS v.
Chadha,153 declared the legislative veto unconstitutional for several
reasons in line with Madison's concerns. The veto allows lawmaking
to proceed through the action of one or two institutions, rather than
the full three specified in article I as a safeguard against factions.
150. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 68.
151. See Stewart, supra note 76, at 1760-90 (explaining that high costs associated with
agency decisionmaking processes create environment where agency decisions usually conform
to interests of regulated concerns).
152. See Schoenbrod, Clean Air Act, supra note 13, at 812-14 (recognizing strategies that
may meet needs inadequately filled by delegation); Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 1277-79 (opposing delegation but acknowledging that reconstitutive techniques could result in simplicity,
efficiency, and reduced burden on legislative processes). The delegation doctrine would also
filter out the enactment of some statutes. Other statutes, such as those dealing with the management of government property rather than the coercion of private action, do not raise delegation problems. As to the remaining statutes, Congress' work in a world without delegation
would be far less than the sum of Congress' and agencies' work in a world with delegation.
Much of the agencies' work is not drafting rules of conduct, but in following elaborate procedures that Congress mandates to give supposed content to its delegation. Congress' own job
in delegating is complicated by these elaborate instructions, that frequently go on for many
pages of sections and subsections, all of which need to dovetail. It is hard to compromise over
such legislation because each part affects every other. But when Congress itself sets the rules,
such as it might for instance by enacting emission limits for electric power plants, it can compromise upon the limits in the same way as one haggles over the price of a rug in a street
market. Congress would also save time because its members would need far less oversight of
the operation of agencies to whom it broadly delegates.
153. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Veto provisions also allow lawmaking to proceed by Congress failing to act, thereby reducing the extent to which members of Congress need take responsibility for their exercise of power.
Related to the legislative veto is the concept that legislative oversight introduces electoral accountability into the agency lawmaking
process. Agencies may be dissuaded from action by the harsh words
of a key member of Congress or a subcommittee, suggesting perhaps that some proposed action would result in a funding cut. Legislative oversight has all the shortcomings of the legislative veto,
plus others. Congressional control is informal and therefore often
invisible. The control often is by a single committee or even an individual member rather than the full house so that most members
need not take any responsibility for it. These features allow members of Congress to avoid responsibility so that their political costs
do not correspond to the costs borne by the public. Accordingly,
there is no reason to suppose that the tension between members of
Congress and the Executive in legislative oversight will make administrative action responsive to the interests of the public. There may
be tension in legislative oversight, but the stakes are as likely to be
the division of power "within the beltway" as the interests of the
constituents without.
Another approach is to claim that the accountability of the legislative process lost through delegation is replaced by the accountability
of the President, who appoints the officials who will exercise the delegated power. As the Court stated in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. :154
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices resolving
the competing interest which Congress itself inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in the light of everyday
realities. 155
This approach sacrifices many of the protections of the full legislative process, particularly the requirement of action by three distinct
institutions.
Pierce places considerable reliance on the accountability of the
presidency in arguing that delegation is legitimate. 156 Yet he ac154. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
155. Id. at 865-66. Chevron's holding did not address the propriety of delegation. Pierce
cites this language from Chevron as a rejoinder to the delegation doctrine. See Pierce, supra

note 76, at 506.
156.

See generally Pierce, supra note 3.
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knowledges, in passing, that the "president is imperfectly accountable to the electorate."'' 5 7 There are solid reasons for this admission,
which cuts the ground from under Pierce's own position. For example, the President's actual political responsibility for some appointee's interpretation of a statute is likely to be less than that of
Congress and its members for the enactment of a statute. A member of Congress' political responsibility for a given vote is softened
by voters having to choose between candidates who present a broad
array of positions.158 The voters cannot choose candidate "A" for
the purpose of one issue and candidate "B" for the purpose of another issue. The requirement that voters elect one package of positions or another may be a weakness- or a strength, but it surely does
not negate accountability. After all, in many political contests, a six
percent margin of victory is considered substantial. That margin
can be wiped out by a swing in three percent of the votes. In any
one local contest, there are likely to be quite a few issues that could
make for such a swing and the incumbent cannot necessarily tell
what those issues will be when voting in Congress. That the voters
need to choose the votes of their representatives wholesale still does
not free the representative from political tension on many issues.' 59
At the presidential level, electoral responsibility for a decision is
far weaker. Issues of local interest are diluted. Questions about the
behavior of the President's role in domestic lawmaking must take
their place along with other factors that voters consider, including
foreign affairs. Also, personality may well be a bigger factor at the
presidential level. Finally, a legislative representative must accept
responsibility for a vote, the President need not accept responsibility for someone else's action, even though that someone was
appointed by the President. Presidents have often distanced themselves from the decisions of their appointees.
Before legitimizing broad agency powers on the basis that an
elected President appoints the delegate, one ought to consider that
we frequently view as dictatorial governments in which the dominant form of electoral participation is election of the chief of state.
Doubtless there are many differences between such regimes and our
administrative state, but this country is not magically immune to dictatorial power.
157. Id. at 409.
158. Mashaw, supra note 15, at 87.
159. Representatives from safe districts tend to vote the interests of their constituents. J.
PENNOCK, supra note 111, at 317.
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Argument. safeguards in the administrativeprocess are unimportant
because regulatees can take care of themselves

One might argue that regulatees, such as big industrial concerns,
are powerful and can protect themselves perfectly well, whether
from a legislature or an agency. This argument totally ignores the
public's interest in accountable government and is only partially responsive to regulatees' interest in fair regulation.
It is true that agencies frequently disregard the beneficiaries of
regulation. But the relative powerlessness of regulatory beneficiaries before the agency does not necessarily translate into the immunity of regulatees from discretionary power. Many regulatees are
small concerns with little access to the powers that be. Some corporations may, in fact, use their resources to get regulators to protect
them from competition, thereby hurting other private concerns and,
often, the supposed beneficiaries of regulation. Even big concerns
can get pushed around in the regulatory process when public anxiety has been aroused. For instance, during the scandals concerning
the Environmental Protection Agency's handling of toxic dumpsites,
regulatees found it difficult to get agency officials to give necessary
160
approvals for quite innocent actions.
Both the regulation's beneficiaries and the regulatees may lose
power because another force is gaining discretionary power-the
agency. Administrative law practitioners know that the best argument to an agency is "this will benefit the agency," or, even more
frankly, the official making the decision. 161 Bureaucrats that wield
the power may get various sorts of payoffs: power for its own sake,
expanded job opportunities upon retirement from government,
prestige, promotions within government, or larger appropriations
from Congress. The White House, the Office of Management and
Budget, and members of Congress influence this discretionary
power and also claim their share of the spoils in the same coin as
well as in campaign contributions.
Perhaps this account overstates agencies' power. Agencies do
have trouble getting much done. That, however, in no way negates
the private sector's loss of power to the agencies. Subjecting people
or corporations to complicated bureaucratic processes or prolonged
uncertainty as to what the agency will permit is a substantial power,
160. See Comment, To Police the Police: FunctionalEquivalence to the EIS Requirement and EPA
Remedial Actions Under Superfund, 33 CaTH. L. REv. 863, 868 n.36 (1985) (discussing agency
inertia during Superfund scandals).
161. See DeLong, How to Convince an Agency, 6 REG., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 28-31 (suggesting
strategies for advocating policies before government agencies).
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but it is not necessarily getting anything done. In other words, the
power lost by the private sector can be said to be less than the power
gained by agencies because of the transaction costs of delegation.
Delegation ordinarily carries high transaction costs for two reasons.
First, the agency lacks Congress' political standing, which is often
needed to resolve conflicts. Second, delegation is usually not pure
buck passing, but rather it usually requires that agencies go through
complicated procedures before they resolve an issue.
These procedures involve participants in a merry-go-round of
administrative proceedings, legislative oversight hearings, and judicial reviews. Jerry Mashaw responds to broad concerns about the
smothering effect of legalism in a poignant observation concerning
The Trial by Kafka. 16 2 Mashaw says that "due process," with all
heaviness, is better than just "process," which is the literal translation of the novel's German title.163 This suggests that the horror for
Kafka's hero was being put to a trial without any rules, while at least
in our administrative state there are rules. This actually understates
the hero's problem. It is suggested to Kafka's hero that there are
rules, and that he should know what they are. His inability to under164
stand the rules thus heightens his guilt and sense of helplessness.
This is the situation of those subject to the administrative state who
cannot afford a lawyer with the right expertise and political
connections.
IV.

CONCLUSION:

The Court's Job

The Court has not directly addressed the delegation issue since
1948.165 Unlike many other separation of powers questions where a
clash between the executive and the legislative branches forces the
Court to face the issue, delegation is a separation of powers issue
where these two branches consent not to be separated. Congress,
after all, voted for the delegation of its own power and in no federal
case has the executive claimed to have been assigned too much
power. But in a recent speech that gained wide attention, Attorney
General Meese attacked many concepts used to rationalize delegations, including the idea of "quasi-legislative" powers. 16 6 Nonetheless, when it has come to specifics, he has tracked the interests of his
client. He has attacked delegations to independent agencies, but
162. Id. at 268.
163. Id. at 267-68.
164. S. HAYMAN, KAFKA: A BIOGRAPHY 73-78 (1967).
165. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 774-78 (1948).
166. Address by Attorney General Meese before the Federal Bar Association Annual
Meeting, Detroit, Mich. (Sept. 13, 1985).
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not to agencies in the President's direct control.' 67 The Supreme
Court has, however, repeatedly taken on separation of powers issues
when raised by private parties rather than a branch of
68
government.
Congress, it might be argued, is the expert on ways of legislating
so that the Court should defer. But members of Congress are also
interested parties. Delegation allows them to take popular positions
and avoid difficult choices. Election is easier for the politicians who
avoid hard choices through delegation. It also allows them to share
in the agency patronage, to use Theodore Lowi's term. 169 Members
receive campaign contributions and other help for assisting the private sector deal with the agencies whose broad powers come from
delegation.' 70 At the same time, the political price for delegation is
small, nullifying the argument that there is accountability because
the electorate has consented to it.17' It takes a sophisticated voter

to understand the issue. When delegation became a negative for
Congress, as during the debates leading up to the 1970 Clean Air
Act, Congress simply camouflaged its broad delegation with compli167. Mr. Meese questioned the constitutionality of the Federal Trade Commission on the
basis that it was an agency insulated from presidential control. "The Constitution As a Bill of
Rights: Separation of Powers and Individual Liberties," Lecture by Attorney General Meese,
University of Dallas 10-11 (Feb. 2 1986). In Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3184 (1986),
the Reagan administration opposed power being granted to the General Accounting Office on
the basis that it was not in the control of the President.
168. This is true, of course, of early delegation cases. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935) (striking down congressional delegation
to President of authority to approve codes of fair competition on grounds that Congress may
not abdicate essential legislative functions); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421
(1935) (invalidating statute that allowed President to prohibit interstate transportation of petroleum because limitations on Congress' authority to delegate are necessary to maintain constitutional system). There are also more recent cases with delegation overtones. See, e.g.,
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-46 (1980)
(construing regulatory statute to avoid potential delegation issue); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 (1976) (holding that agent of government may not arbitrarily subject
aliens to different substantive rules than those applied to citizens without congressional authorization); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42 (1974)
(construing statute to avoid potential delegation issue); Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 168-70 (1972) (holding vagrancy statute unconstitutionally vague); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (construing narrowly delegated powers that impinge on citizens'
right to travel). There are other examples as well. E.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59
(1983) (striking down one-house legislative veto of deportation decisions made by Attorney
General); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57, 64, 87
(1982) (ruling that Congress is not constitutionally empowered to create legislative courts to
adjudicate bankruptcy matters); see also BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609-12
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that task of Internal Revenue Service is to administer
revenue laws, not promote public policy); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508-10 (1970)
(PowellJ., concurring) (stating that Congress has constitutional discretion to choose suitable
remedy to redress racial discrimination).
169. T. Lowi, supra note 105, at 137.
170. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 87, at 58.
171. See Mashaw, supra note 15, at 87 (stating that voters rely heavily on perceptions of
candidates' broad ideological stances and not their action on particular bill).
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cated instructions that fooled even many specialists into believing
that Congress has made the hard choices. 17 2 In short, the political
process cannot police the legislative process' yearning to delegate.
The Supreme Court does, in other doctrinal settings, overturn
legislative judgments on the basis that they insulate government
from majority control. Baker v. Carr17 3 and its progeny protect the
majority of the public against the self-interested machinations of
legislative incumbents. 174 The courts strike down constraints on
speech not just on the basis that the majority is controlling minority
views, but also on the basis that officials are suppressing criticism.
The rationale for these two lines of cases is captured in the second
paragraph of a United States v. Carolene Products Co. 175 footnote which
calls for judicial intervention to protect governmental accountability. 176 In addition to accountability, the rights of regulatees should
provoke enforcement of the delegation doctrine.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 745-46, 751.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 193.
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Id. at 152 n.4.

